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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Assuming that Appellant's Notice of Appeal was timely filed, the Supreme Court has 
jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(j) and was authorized to 
transfer this appeal to the Court of Appeals under Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(4). The Court of 
Appeals has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(k). Appellee 
moved to dismiss this appeal as untimely. Because this Court denied that motion by Order dated 
October 20, 2000, Appellee does not further address jurisdiction in this Brief. Appellee reserves 
the right to assert that this Court lacked jurisdiction over this appeal should this case come before 
the Utah Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Appellee is not satisfied with Appellant's statement of the issues. Appellant's statement of 
the issues contains facts, statements, and conclusions that are inaccurate and inappropriate. 
Further, many of the issues presented for review were not properly raised before the Court below. 
Appellant's failure separately to identify where in the record each of his issues was raised below 
(rather than in one unsegregated pile of citations under paragraph E on page 3 of his Brief) makes 
impossible a determination of where Appellant claims each issue was raised below. Appellee 
therefore reformats Appellant's stated issues and will identify those that were not raised below: 
A. Statutory Construction. 
1. Does Utah Code Ann. §57-1-12 apply to this case, where Holmes prevailed against 
the challenge to its title, but the challenge was based upon the misconduct of its grantor, Spencer? 
This issue was preserved in Spencer's Objection to Holmes' Motion for Summary 
Judgment [R. 765]. 
1 
The standard of review for this issue is correctness. Carlie v. Morgan, 922 P.2d 1 (Utah 
1996). 
2. Did plaintiffs action against Holmes violate Utah Code Ann. Title 57, Chapters 4a 
and 9 and, if so, does that preclude Holmes from recovering defense costs from Spencer? 
This issue was preserved by a one sentence reference in Spencer's Objection to Holmes' 
Motion for Summary Judgment. [R. 770]. 
The standard of review for this issue is correctness. Carlie v. Morgan, 922 P.2d 1 (Utah 
1996). 
3. Did plaintiffs action against Spencer seek only remedies prohibited by Utah Code 
Ami. Title 57, Chapter 6, and, if so, does that preclude Holmes from recovering defense costs 
from Spencer? 
This issue was not raised below. Spencer has not offered any statement of grounds for 
seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial court as required by Rule 24(a)(5)(B), Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
The standard for review of this issue is correctness. Carlie v. Morgan, 922 P.2d 1 (Utah 
1996). 
B. Duty to Defend. 
1. Does a statement that the property is being purchased "as is" in a preliminary 
contract, which is followed by delivery of a warranty deed warranting title, disclaim the warran-
ties otherwise implied in the warranty deed? 
2 
This issue was not properly raised below.l Spencer has not offered any statement of 
grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial court as required by Rule 
24(a)(5)(B), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
The standard of review for this issues is correctness. Carlie v. Morgan, 922 P.2d 1 (Utah 
1996). 
2. Does the title insurance policy between Holmes and its title insurer, to which 
Spencer is not a party, have any relevance to this appeal? 
This issue was not raised below.2 Spencer has not offered any statement of grounds for 
seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial court as required by Rule 24(a)(5)(B), Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
The standard of review for this issue is correctness. Carlie v. Morgan, 922 P.2d 1 (Utah 
1996). 
C. The Summary Judgment Standard. 
Did there exist a genuine issue of material fact on the subject of whether Spencer offered a 
defense which precluded summary judgment in this case? 
This issue was preserved below in Spencer's Objection to Holmes1 Motion for Summary 
Judgment. [R. 765]. 
1
 This defense was not pleaded as an affirmative defense by Spencer and was not 
mentioned in his Opposition Memorandum to Holmes' Motion for Summary Judgment. [R. 
765]. After the Court granted the Motion, Spencer submitted the purchase contract and title 
insurance materials, without eyidentiary foundation, and argued this issue. The Court refused to 
consider this "evidence." [R. 1330, 1332, 1343]. Evidence not submitted to a Court prior to its 
ruling on summary judgment or properly rejected by the Court may not be considered on appeal. 
Hartford Leasing Corp. v. State, 888 P.2d 694, 698 n. 3 (Utah App. 1994), cert, denied 899 P.2d 
1231 (Utah 1995); Territorial Sav. & LoanAss'n v. Baird, 781 P.2d 452 (Utah App. 1989). 
2
 Id 
The standard of review is correctness. Carlie v. Morgan, 922 P.2d 1 (Utah 1996). 
D. Reasonableness of Fees. 
Did the district court correctly conclude that the fees awarded in this case were reason-
able? 
This issue was raised below in Spencer's Objection to Holmes' Motion for Summary 
Judgment. [R. 765]. 
The standard of review for this issue is correctness. Carlie v. Morgan, 922 P.2d 1 (Utah 
1996). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
There are no determinative provisions. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Plaintiffs Byington, Webster, and Summit Condo 4 initiated this action against Thomas L. 
Spencer ("Spencer"), John Holmes Construction, Inc. ("Holmes"), and others. Plaintiffs alleged 
that they and other partners of Summit Condo 4 paid all the consideration for and were the owners 
of the real property that is the subject of this action, but that Spencer improperly conveyed the 
property to himself and then sold it to Holmes for approximately one quarter million dollars and 
kept all the money for himself. Plaintiffs sought an adjudication of their ownership of the subject 
property and a money judgment against Spencer. Holmes filed a crossclaim against Spencer 
seeking recovery of all amounts incurred in defending against plaintiffs' claims based upon the 
warranties contained in Spencer's warranty deed to Holmes. 
4 
Course of Proceedings 
Plaintiffs initiated their action on July 18, 1997. Holmes successfully moved for summary 
judgment against plaintiffs, and the District Court dismissed plaintiffs' claims against Holmes and 
validated Holmes' title to the property as a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of 
plaintiffs' claims against Spencer. [R. 681]. Holmes then moved for summary judgment against 
Spencer seeking a determination that Spencer owed Holmes its defense costs. The Court granted 
Holmes' Motion for Summary Judgment against Spencer and entered Judgment against Spencer on 
February 2, 2000. [R. 1359]. After the Court announced its ruling in favor of Holmes in October, 
1999, but before the Summary Judgment just noted was entered, Spencer on January 27, 2000 
filed a "Motion to Reconsider Amount of Fees Awarded" and Memorandum in support thereof. 
[R. 1330, 1332]. The District Court denied that Motion on May 16, 2000. [R. 1398]. Spencer 
filed his Notice of Appeal on May 30, 2000. [R. 1404]. Holmes moved to dismiss the appeal as 
untimely on July 5, 2000. The Court of Appeals denied that Motion on October 20, 2000. 
After a trial between plaintiffs and Spencer, the District Court ruled in favor of plaintiffs 
and against Spencer "on all counts in the complaint." [R. 1519, p. 75]. The District Court ruled 
that Spencer had engaged in fraudulent behavior and awarded plaintiffs their attorney's fees 
because Spencer's defense was in bad faith. [R. 1519 (Transcript) at pp. 75-77; 78-79]. 
Disposition in the Court below 
The District Court granted Holmes' Motion for Summary Judgment against Spencer, 
entered Judgment against Spencer in the amount of $42,806.74, and directed the entry of final 
Judgment under Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The District Court denied Spencers' 
Motion to Reconsider the Reasonableness of the Attorney's Fees, which was filed after the District 
Court ruled upon Holmes' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Statement of Facts 
Spencer's Statement of Facts is incomplete, inaccurate, and omits citations to the record. It 
is not even close to a balanced statement of what occurred below. Holmes therefore advances its 
own Statement of Facts. 
1. Property Transfers. Plaintiffs Byington and Webster claim to be partners of 
Summit Condo 4, a partnership. [R. 002, ff2, 3]. The property that is the subject of this action 
(the "Property") was conveyed to Summit Condo 4 in 1981. [R. 29]. Summit Condo 4 then 
conveyed the Property to Spencer-Gamble Development, a partnership in 1982. [R. 425]. 
Spencer-Gamble Development conveyed the Property to Spencer pursuant to a Warranty Deed 
signed by Spencer, and Spencer conveyed the Property to Holmes by Warranty Deed [R. 430, 
433]. 
2. Plaintiffs' Action Against Holmes. After Holmes purchased the Property from 
Spencer for $236,111.00, Holmes built condominiums on the Property. [R. 714, f2]. After that 
construction had occurred, plaintiffs filed their lawsuit against Holmes and Spencer. In their 
Complaint, plaintiffs alleged that they, and not Holmes, were the rightful owners of the Property. 
[Complaint, ^[ 51 and prayer for relief, | 1 ; R. 001]. Plaintiffs' claims against Holmes therefore put 
in jeopardy the Property, then improved with condominiums. After the Complaint was filed, 
Holmes' counsel propounded and responded to written discovery and took and defended not less 
than seven depositions. [R. 706, [^5]. Holmes then filed a Motion for Summary Judgment against 
plaintiffs entailing over 230 pages of briefing and exhibits. [R. 404-501; 506-639]. At issue in 
that Motion was whether Holmes had knowledge or notice of plaintiffs' claims against the 
Property, whether the conveyances of the Property from Summit Condo 4 to Spencer-Gamble 
Development and the conveyance from Spencer-Gamble Development to Spencer were unautho-
rized or otherwise subject to challenge by plaintiff as against Holmes who acquired the Property 
without notice, whether the plaintiffs had been in possession of the Property within seven years 
prior to the commencement of the action within the meaning of the Utah Code Ann. §78-12-5, and 
whether the fraudulent concealment of Spencer tolled the running of the Statute of Limitations 
against Holmes. [Id.]. The Court on October 27, 1998 entered an Order granting Holmes' Motion 
for Summary Judgment and determining in substance that Holmes acquired the Property without 
knowledge or notice of any misdeeds or inappropriate execution of documents by Spencer and that 
any fraudulent concealment by Spencer was not chargeable to Holmes. [Order Granting Summary 
Judgment, R. 681]. 
Spencer suggests throughout his Brief that Holmes' counsel merely "coat tailed" Spencer's 
counsel and that Spencer's counsel did all that could have been done to extricate Holmes from this 
case. That is inaccurate. Spencer's total involvement in Holmes' Motion for Summary Judgment 
against plaintiffs was to file a two page paper stating that Spencer "did not oppose" Holmes' 
Motion. Holmes — not Spencer — took and paid for the depositions of plaintiffs. A review of the 
record will demonstrate that in fact Spencer did nothing that assisted Holmes in this case. The file 
will rather reflect that Holmes was successful in defending its title because it was able to show that 
Holmes did not participate in and was not aware of the misconduct of Spencer, which has now 
been adjudicated. 
3. Spencer's Dealings With Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs allege that they and George Gamble 
created a joint venture called Summit Condo 4 and that Gamble was the managing partner. 
Plaintiffs Byington and Webster allege that they and other Summit Condo 4 partners paid 
$130,000.00 to purchase the Property. The Property was thereafter conveyed by Summit Condo 4 
to Spencer-Gamble Development, a partnership between Spencer and George Gamble. Prior to 
1990, Spencer assumed management of Spencer-Gamble Development and Summit Condo 4. 
Over a period longer than a decade, Spencer corresponded with the plaintiffs, discussed their 
partnership interests in the Property, and periodically requested reimbursement of taxes and other 
expenses relating to the Property. In 1993, Spencer learned that the Property was titled in Spencer-
Gamble Development (rather than Summit Condo 4). At that time, Spencer signed a deed from 
Spencer-Gamble Development to himself. [Complaint, ffi[2-34; R. 002-008]. Spencer then entered 
into an agreement to sell the Property to Holmes for approximately $236,000.00. [R. 713-14, 721]. 
Another of the partners of Summit Condo 4, one Josephson, learned of the pendency of the sale 
and filed an action alleging that Spencer held title to the Property for the Summit Condo 4 partners, 
including him, and recorded Lis Pendens against the Property. [R. 566, 436]. Spencer ultimately 
closed his sale with Holmes and sold the Property to Holmes for a price of approximately 
$236,000.00. [R. 480]. Spencer settled separately with Josephson prior to the sale and escrowed 
$50,000.00 so that the Josephson Lis Pendens could be released to allow the sale to Holmes to be 
closed. [R. 479-481]. At closing, Spencer delivered to Holmes a Warranty Deed in statutory form, 
which made no exception for the claims of the partners of Summit Condo 4. [R. 714, ^[3; 721]. 
Other than Josephson, Spencer gave the partners of Summit Condo 4 no part of the proceeds of the 
Holmes' sale. The District Court ruled in plaintiffs' favor on all counts, found that Spencer 
engaged in fraudulent behavior, and awarded plaintiffs their attorney's fees because Spencer's 
defense was not advanced in good faith. [R. 1519 (Transcript) at pp. 75-77; 78-79]. 
4. Holmes' Claims Against Spencer. Spencer stated in an Affidavit filed in this case 
[R. 773] that when he was served with the Complaint in this action he contacted a representative of 
Holmes and offered to defend Holmes.3 Holmes thereafter engaged counsel and filed its Answer, 
Counterclaim, and Crossclaim. [R. 108]. The Crossclaim was against Spencer and alleged that 
Spencer was obligated to defend Holmes under the covenants of the warranty deed, contained a 
demand that Spencer perform those obligations, and sought an award from Spencer of Holmes' 
defense costs. [R. 121-22]. Spencer responded to the Crossclaim, alleging that the Crossclaim 
failed to state a claim, and denying any duty to defend Holmes. [R. 136-37, responses to ff5, 6, 7, 
and 8]. Spencer's Answers to Holmes' Crossclaim never mentioned or asserted as a defense or fact 
his present assertions that he tendered a defense to Holmes, that the Crossclaim was unmeritorious 
because he was willing to defend Holmes, that Holmes had declined to accept Spencer's defense, 
that no defense was owed because plaintiffs' action violated U.C.A. Title 57, Chs. 4a, 6, or 9, that 
Holmes purchased the Property "as is," or that Spencer's dealings with a title insurer were 
somehow a defense. [R. 136]. Holmes then pursued its defense to a conclusion with the District 
Court's entry of an Order dismissing Holmes from the case as a bona fide purchaser for value. 
Holmes then filed its Motion for Summary Judgment against Spencer. [R. 703]. Spencer 
responded with a brief Opposition memorandum and the first Affidavits of Thomas Spencer and 
Timothy Miguel Willardson dated respectively July 28 and 29, 1999. [R. 765, 773, 779]. Holmes 
replied to those submissions and, on that record, Holmes' Motion was argued to the Court. The 
District Court granted Holmes' Motion and entered Judgment against Spencer. [R. 1359]. After 
the Motion had been argued and decided from the bench by the Court on October 6, 1999 [R. 982], 
Spencer filed his Motion to Reconsider Amount of Fees Awarded, a Memorandum in support 
thereof, and the further Affidavit of Thomas Spencer introducing additional evidentiary matters 
3
 Holmes assumes the accuracy of that untrue statement for purposes of this appeal. It 
will be demonstrated that not only is it untrue, it is also a statement that is unbelievable and 
irrelevant. 
dated January 27, 2000. [R. 1330, 1332, 1343]. The Court denied Spencer's Motion to Reconsider 
Amounts of Fees Awarded by Order dated May 16, 2000. [R. 1398]. Spencer did not appeal from 
that Order and does not in his Brief argue that this Order was improper. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
A. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 
1. Spencer Owed Holmes a Defense Under §57-1-12. 
Section 57-1-12 requires that a grantor defend against claims created by the grantor's own 
conduct or reasonably known to the grantor at the time of the conveyance. That circumstance 
exists here. 
2. and 3. Were Plaintiffs' Claims Violative of U.CA. Title 57, Chapters 4a, 6, or 9? 
Title 57, Chapters 4a, 6, and 9, have no application to the facts before the Court. Spencer's 
claim with respect to Title 57, Chapter 6, was not raised below and cannot properly be considered 
on appeal. 
B. DUTY TO DEFEND 
Spencer is not relieved of his duty to defend Holmes based on the "as is" provisions of their 
underlying contract and Spencer's agreement with Holmes' title insurer because (i) neither issue 
was raised in Spencer's Answer, (ii) Spencer raised neither issue prior to the Court's granting 
Holmes' Motion for Summary Judgment, (iii) there is no evidentiary foundation for Spencer's 
claims, (iv) the "as is" provision relates to the Property's condition, not its title, (v) if the "as is" 
provision related to title, it merged into the Warranty Deed, and (iv) Spencer has not explained 
why his contract with Holmes' title carrier impacts Holmes' claims against Spencer. 
C. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD 
1. Whether Holmes Offered a Defense. Spencer's claim that he offered a defense to 
Holmes is legally irrelevant because after he made that disputed oral offer, he denied in his 
pleadings any obligation to defend and failed to advance this defense as an affirmative defense in 
his Answer. 
2. Necessity of Defense Costs. The requirement that defense costs be "reasonable" 
embraces an element of necessity, but there is no independent requirement that defense costs be 
"necessary." Holmes' defense was necessary because plaintiffs sought to deprive Holmes of title to 
the Property. 
D. REASONABLENESS OF FEES ASSESSED 
1. Relationship to Amount at Issue. Plaintiffs challenged title to the Property* 
(which Spencer admitted as an undisputed fact), which was worth seven figures. The evidentiary 
materials on which Spencer relies were not timely submitted to the Court below and were not in 
any event admissible. 
2. There was no Issue of Fact Concerning the Reasonableness of the Fees 
Awarded. The Willardson Affidavit, which is claimed to raise an issue as to the reasonableness of 
Holmes' legal fees, contains the unsupported conclusion that the fees were unreasonable, without 
stating the basis for that conclusion. The Willardson Affidavit does not contain elements held 
essential by Utah appellate courts in addressing reasonableness of legal fees. The Willardson 
Affidavit's statements concerning this subject are, as a matter of law, irrelevant and/or incorrect. 
3. Duplicative Work. Holmes' counsel did not duplicate the work performed by 
Spencer's attorney. 
4. Holmesf Counsel did not "Run Up" His Bill. Holmes' counsel's deferring 
Holmes' Motion for Summary Judgment until essential discovery was complete was necessary, and 
the course suggested by Spencer's counsel would have constituted malpractice. 
ARGUMENT 
A. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 
1. Spencer Owed Holmes a Defense under §57-1-12. 
Spencer addresses this issue at pages 8 to 10 of his Brief. There he argues that because 
Holmes successfully defended and because plaintiffs' claims against Holmes' were not valid, 
plaintiffs' claims were not "lawful" claims and therefore were not within the scope of Spencer's 
duty to defend under Utah Code Ann. §57-1-12. For these reasons, Spencer is wrong. First, the 
Courts hold that a deed's defense covenant applies to claims created by the grantor's conduct or 
known to the grantor at the time of conveyance. Second, the correct inquiry is not whether 
plaintiffs' claims against Holmes specifically were lawful; rather, the correct inquiry is whether 
plaintiffs' claims arose from Spencer's conduct or whether plaintiffs' claims against Spencer as 
grantor were "lawful." Third, Spencer's claims that Utah Code Ann. Title 57, Chapters 4a, 6, and 9 
render plaintiffs' claims unlawful is baseless and was in part not raised below. Each will be 
addressed in turn. 
Section 57-1-2 Requires that Spencer Defend. Spencer argues that his Warranty Deed 
contained a covenant to defend against only "lawful" claims and that since Holmes successfully 
defended, Spencer should not be required to pay the cost of that defense. Spencer's assertion 
makes no logical sense. Spencer sold the Property to Holmes and received from Holmes almost a 
quarter million dollars in cash. Plaintiffs filed this action seeking a determination that Spencer 
improperly took plaintiffs' property for himself and that plaintiffs, and not Holmes (to which 
Spencer sold the Property) should own the Property. After himself committing all of the acts that 
gave rise to plaintiffs' claims, Spencer incredibly asserts that Holmes should not be able to recover 
from Spencer the costs of defending against the claims that arose from Spencer's own conduct and 
which the trial court found, after a trial, were valid claims against Spencer. Spencer's interpreta-
tion would allow grantors to do what Spencer has done here - with full advance knowledge of 
adverse claims to title, convey and warrant to innocent parties like Holmes, and then force those 
innocent parties to bear the cost of defending against those claims. Spencer not only himself 
caused plaintiffs' claims, but he was also unquestionably on notice of those claims (because of the 
Josephson action) before selling the Property to Holmes and warranting that such claims did not 
exist. There is another reason why Spencer's interpretation is illogical. It does not allow any party 
objectively to determine whether a duty to defend exists until the claims at issue have been fully 
adjudicated as meritorious or unmeritorious. The decision to defend or not would on Spencer's 
theory have to be made based upon a future, unknown determination -- a preposterous result. 
The Utah Supreme Court has not decided any case interpreting Section 57-1-12 in any 
context similar to the one presented here. Spencer offers no such cases from any jurisdiction. The 
cases that Spencer offers address what is meant by "lawful" in irrelevant, non-analogous contexts.4 
Although many Courts state that a grantee's successful defense precludes recovery of 
attorney's fees from the grantor who covenanted only against "lawful" claims, there exist well 
4
 In re Fisk's Estate, 98 Utah 288, 95 P.2d 502 (Utah 1939) addressed what claims were 
"lawful" claims to be paid by an estate. Tarpey v Madsen, 17 Utah 352, 53 P. 996 (Utah 1898), 
rev'd 178 U.S. 215 (1900) addressed what claims were "lawful" under Railroad and Homestead 
Acts. What claims are "lawful" and therefore must be paid in these contexts is of course vastly 
different from, and irrelevant to, whether a claim is lawful and must be defended in the context of 
a warranty deed. They are no authority for this proposition. Creason v. Peterson, 470 P.2d 403 
(Utah 1970) does not address the duty to defend; that Court held only that attorney fees incurred 
in curing title deficiencies are recoverable from the grantor. 
recognized exceptions to that rule, including (i) when there existed a lawful claim against the-
grantor, (ii) when the grantor's conduct gave rise to the claim defended by the grantee, and (iii) 
when the grantor reasonably should have known of the claim at the time he delivered the warranty 
deed. In Koelker v. Turnbull, 899 P.2d 972 (Ida. 1995), the grantor gave the grantee a warranty 
deed warranting that "they will warrant and defend the same from all lawful claims whatsoever." 
Id. at 974. A third party asserted an adverse claim against the property and the grantee filed a quiet 
title action to resolve it. The third party claimant defaulted and title was quieted in the grantee. 
The Court awarded attorney's fees incurred by the grantee in pursuit of the quiet title action. The 
Court identified the issue as whether, at the time the deed was given, the third party claimant had 
claims against the grantor (not the grantee). Id. at 976. Thus, the question is not whether plaintiffs 
have a lawful claim against Holmes, but rather they had a claim against Spencer at the time 
Spencer conveyed the Property to Holmes. The Court justified its award of attorney's fees to the 
grantee upon the equity of requiring the grantor to pay for the defense of claims that he failed to 
disclose to the grantee and against which he warranted. Similarly, in Bloom v. Hendricks, 804 P.2d 
1069 (N. M. 1991), the Court addressed a grantor's liability under a warranty deed covenanting "to 
warrant and defend the title conveyed by the deed against any lawful claim...." Id. at 1073. 
There, the Court recognized that some courts do not allow recovery of defense costs when the 
grantee's defense is successful on the theory that the grantor should not be responsible for 
defending against frivolous claims with respect to which the grantor had no responsibility. On the 
other hand, the Court reasoned, when the grantor "bears some responsibility for the substance of an 
adverse claim, or had actual or constructive knowledge of a potential adverse claim at the time he 
warranted his title and agreed to defend it," the grantor should be liable for the grantee's defense 
costs. In Jablonski v. Buckeye Dev. Corp., 597 S.2d 905 (Fla. 1992), the Court held that a 
covenant to defend against lawful claims gave rise to a duty to pay for the grantee's successful 
defense of his title where the grantee was able to prevail because of equitable defenses to a 
legitimate claim against the grantor. The Supreme Court of Iowa holds that a grantee's legal fees 
are recoverable under a covenant to defend against lawful claims even when the grantee prevails in 
its defense, where the grantee prevailed on equitable grounds or the grantor's negligent behavior 
allowed the claim to arise. Kendall v. Lowther, 356 N.W.2d 181 (Iowa 1984); McDonald v. Delhi 
Sav. Bank, 440 N.W.2d 839 (Iowa 1989). And the Supreme Court of Minnesota held that a grantee 
successfully defending could recover from the grantor under a covenant to defend against lawful 
claims if the grantor's own acts thrust the grantee into the litigation. First Fiduciary Corp. v. 
Blanco, 276 N.W.2d 30 (Minn. 1979). 
It is difficult to quarrel with the logic of these cases. Fairness, logic, and reason require 
that a grantor pay the costs of defending against the claims that he himself created or of which he 
had knowledge when he warranted title and promised to defend the grantee. Here, the District 
Court found that Spencer knew or should have known that plaintiffs claimed title to the Property 
and of the facts giving rise to plaintiffs' claims. Spencer does not challenge that finding. Plaintiffs 
have now prevailed against Spencer on all their claims at trial. Holmes escaped as an innocent 
bona fide purchaser, but unquestionably Spencer's conduct gave rise to the claims against Holmes, 
which required Holmes to defend. Spencer should be required to pay Holmes' defense costs. 
2. and 3. Were Plaintiffs' Claims Violative of U.C.A. Title 57, Chapters 4a, 6, or 9? 
Plaintiffs' claims against Holmes were serious claims entailing exposure for Holmes in the amount 
of the price of the Property ($236,111.00) plus the value of the condominiums built on the 
Property. Plaintiffs claimed that Spencer improperly deprived them of their property and executed 
the deeds in Holmes' chain of title without authority and that Holmes' lacked title to the Property 
because Holmes' took with actual or constructive knowledge of those facts. Spencer admitted 
Holmes' undisputed fact No. 5, which stated that plaintiffs alleged that they, and not Holmes, were 
the owners of the Property. [R. 714, 765]. The District Court after a trial found for plaintiffs on all 
counts. Holmes escaped losing its improved Property solely because Holmes was innocent and 
had no knowledge of Spencer's misconduct. 
Spencer advances three statutes that he contends rendered plaintiffs' claims unlawful.5 
Spencer's argument that Title 57, Chapter 4a, renders plaintiffs' claims unlawful consumes one 
sentence at the bottom of page 9 of his Brief and states only that plaintiffs' Complaint failed to 
address "certain presumptions" which Spencer does not identify for us. Because Spencer does not 
state why Title 57, Chapter 4a creates any presumption that would have been dispositive, Holmes 
is unable intelligently to address that argument here. If what Spencer is suggesting is that the 
deeds that he fraudulently executed on behalf of Spencer-Gamble Development and on his own 
behalf, which conveyed the Property to Holmes, are somehow bulletproof because of those 
presumptions,6 he is plainly wrong. Plaintiffs overcame those presumptions by demonstrating that 
Spencer improperly deprived them of their Property. Holmes was exposed to losing that same 
Property, which Spencer conveyed to Holmes, unless Holmes could establish that it was a bona 
fide purchaser for value. 
Spencer next argues that under the occupying claimant statute, §57-6-1, et seq., property 
cannot be taken from an occupying claimant who has improved it absent compliance with certain 
5
 £ach of the statutes he advances, even if he were correct (which he is not) make the 
claims unlawful only as against Holmes - not Spencer. As already shown, what is important is 
Spencer's responsibility for the claims and the nature of the claims against Spencer — not 
Holmes. 
6
 Section 57-4a-4 provides that a recorded instrument creates presumptions that it is 
genuine, executed by a competent person, delivery occurred, the signatory was authorized, etc. 
procedures. First of all, Spencer never raised this issue before the trial court and he cannot 
therefore raise it now.7 Second, the occupying claimant statute has nothing to do with this case. 
The occupying claimant statute addresses what a party having superior title to property occupied 
by another claimant must do before taking possession. In other words, it addresses what the 
prevailing party must do after the occupant "in a proper action [is] found not to be the owner. . . . " 
Utah Code Ann. §57-6-1. The occupying claimant statute is not even implicated until the action 
challenging title (that is, this action) is concluded. The occupying claimant statute merely gives a 
possessor who has improved property in good faith the right under certain circumstances to recover 
the cost of improvements from the owner of superior title. U.C.A. §57-6-3. It gives the occupying 
claimant (Holmes) no protection for the price paid for the property in question — here, about a 
quarter million dollars. Spencer's statement that this statute rendered plaintiffs' claims unlawful is 
frivolous. 
Spencer next relies upon Title 57, Chapter 9, which he states "provides that purchasers are 
entitled to rely upon record title." [Spencer's Brief, pp. 9-10]. That statute is the marketable record 
title act, which also has absolutely no application to plaintiffs' claims. The marketable record title 
act protects against and sometime extinguishes interests "existing prior to the effective date of the 
root of title," which root must by definition have been recorded "as of a date 40 years prior to the 
time when marketability is being determined." Utah Code Ann. §57-9-8(1) and (5). It has nothing 
to do with interests that attach during the 40 years following the root of title. Section 57-9-2 
provides that marketable record title is subject to "any interest arising out of a title transaction 
which has been recorded subsequent to the effective date of the root of title." §57-9-2(4). 
7
 E.g., Malibu Inv. Co. v Sparks, 2000 UT 30, 996 P.2d 1043 (Utah 2000); Monson v. 
Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1022 (Utah 1996). 
Plaintiffs' interest in the Property derived from a deed to Summit Condo 4, which was recorded in 
1981 - surely less than 40 years ago. Spencer's advancing the statute as a basis for his claim that 
plaintiffs' claims were not lawful is, like the last one, frivolous. 
At page 10, Spencer makes a passing suggestion (without any authority) that actual or 
constructive eviction is a prerequisite to a duty to defend under Section 57-1-12. Eviction cannot 
logically be a prerequisite to a duty to defend (which occurs in an action that generally precedes 
eviction). To suggest otherwise is to suggest that Holmes must fail in its defense and be evicted 
before a duty to defend in the first instance arises! None of Spencer's cases state that eviction is a 
prerequisite to a duty to defend. 
It is ironic that Spencer now states that these statutes so clearly render plaintiffs' claims 
invalid. Plaintiffs claimed that Spencer improperly conveyed the Property and deprived plaintiffs 
of their interest in it. Holmes was sued claiming that Holmes took subject to the effects of 
Spencer's misdeeds. The basis for plaintiffs' claims against Holmes were thus the very same as the 
claims against Spencer. But Spencer's Answer does not mention any of these statutes that are now 
claimed to be so obviously dispositive. [R. 92]. 
B. THE DUTY TO DEFEND 
Under this section of his Brief, which appears at page 11, Spencer argues (i) that because 
Spencer sold the Property "as is," Spencer had no duty to defend, and (ii) that under certain 
documents Spencer had some agreement with Holmes' title insurer, which somehow limited 
Spencer's duty to defend Holmes. Spencer's arguments must be rejected for the following 
independently sufficient reasons. 
First Spencer raised neither issue in his Answer to Holmes' Crossclaim.8 [R. 170]. 
Second, Spencer raised neither issue before the District Court granted Holmes' motion. [R. 
765, 773, 779]. Spencer raised these issues only after the Court had granted Holmes' motion in 
connection with Spencer's arguments about the form of the Judgment in favor of Holmes. In fact, 
Spencer referred to these arguments and documents for the first time in his Reply memorandum 
addressing the form of the Judgment granting Holmes' motion. [R. 1200, f4; R. 1204; R. 1214]. 
Rule 6(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires that opposing evidentiary materials must be 
served not later than one day before the hearing. Rule 4-501, C.J.A., which governs the briefing 
and argument of Motions for Summary Judgment, provides in subpart (1)(B) that the party 
responding to a Motion for Summary Judgment must serve "all supporting documentation" with its 
Memorandum in opposition. 
Third, there is no proper evidentiary foundation for Spencer's claims. Spencer submitted 
the materials on which he relies for the "as is" provision and title insurance arrangements after the 
Court ruled against Spencer on Holmes' Motion but before the Judgment was entered. [R. 765-
779]. The Court in its Judgment against Holmes denied Spencer's earlier request to submit the 
same materials because "among other things, the materials were not timely submitted in connection 
with this Motion and the materials had no admissible evidentiary foundation." [Judgment in Favor 
of John Holmes Construction and Against Thomas L. Spencer, fE, (R. 1359)]. Spencer's materials 
have no sworn or other proper evidentiary foundation under Rule 56(e), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, and are not admissible. 
8
 An unpleaded affirmative defense may not be raised for the first time on appeal. 
Sampson v. Richins, 770 P.2d 998 (Utah App. 1989), cert, denied, 776 P.2d 916 (Utah 1989); 
Royal Resources, Inc. v. Gibraltar Fin. Group, 603 P.2d 793 (Utah 1979). 
Fourth, Spencer is not being accurate in stating at page 5 of his Brief that "the property, 
including title, was conveyed 'as is.'" The document on which Spencer relies says nothing about 
title. It states: "9. The Buyer acknowledges that the property will be conveyed 'As Is.1" In this 
context, the "as is" Language clearly refers to the property's condition, not its title. The contract's 
require-ment of a General Warranty Deed was not modified. [R. 1214, %6]. After the date of the 
"as is" contract, Spencer executed a General Warranty Deed to Holmes. That General Warranty 
Deed merged out of existence the "as is" provision,9 even if it related to title, which it clearly did 
not. The contract itself provided that aside from express warranties (which the "as is" provision 
was not), its provisions would not apply after closing. [R. 1215, f 19]. 
Fifth, Spencer has not explained why his contract with Holmes' title carrier (the content of 
which Spencer does not share with us) impacts Holmes' claims against Spencer in this case. 
Because Spencer has not articulated the grounds for his argument, Holmes cannot intelligently 
respond to them in this Brief. Holmes will object to any effort by Spencer to make his argument 
for the first time in his Reply Brief. 
C. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD 
In this section of his Brief (which appears at pages 11 to 13), Spencer asserts that Holmes 
did not establish certain facts or that there existed disputed issues of fact with respect to the these 
points, which are separately discussed below: 
1. Whether Holmes gave Spencer an opportunity to defend and whether Spencer 
attempted to provide that defense. 
2. Whether the time expended by Holmes' counsel was necessary. 
Q
 Delivery of a deed effects a merger and extinguishment of the terms of the underlying 
contract relating to title. Dansie v High Country Estates Homeowner's Ass'n, 1999 UT 62, 98 
P.2d 30 (Utah 1999); Secor v. Knight, 716 P.2d 790, 792 (Utah 1986). 
1. Did Spencer Attempt to Furnish a Defense? Spencer concedes that Holmes filed 
a Crossclaim against Spencer in which Holmes alleged that Spencer had an obligation to defend 
Holmes in this case and that Spencer denied that obligation in his Answer. [R. 108, 136]. 
Spencer's self-serving Affidavit, filed after the defense of Holmes was complete, stated that he 
offered a defense to a representative of Holmes.10 After Holmes allegedly made that oral state-
ment, Spencer responded to Holmes' Crossclaim, denied any obligation to defend, and took no 
further action to undertake Holmes' defense. Spencer did not plead in his Answer that he had 
attempted to furnish or had tendered a defense. The record is devoid of any evidence that Spencer 
or his counsel took any action to defend Holmes other than not opposing Holmes' Motion for 
Summary Judgment against plaintiffs. Although invited to do so at the hearing of this Motion, 
Spencer's attorney declined to offer the Court any occasion during which he communicated to 
Holmes' counsel over the two years that the case was pending that Spencer wished to defend 
Holmes, offered to defend Holmes, or that Holmes' defense through its own counsel was unneces-
sary.11 
The District Court ruled that Spencer's failure to plead his tender of defense or Holmes' 
refusal of a defense precluded Spencer from arguing this point. The District Court alternatively 
found that Spencer's alleged oral offer to defend was irrelevant because thereafter, Spencer filed 
pleadings denying a duty to defend. The District Court also found that Spencer's counsel in this 
action, who allegedly was the counsel offered to Holmes, was precluded from acting as counsel for 
10
 As already indicated, Holmes disputes that statement and it is, in any event, irrelevant, 
as will be shown. 
11
 Although Spencer's Brief states that it relies on "transcript of October 6, 1999 hearing" 
[Appellant's Brief, p. 3, ^|E], no such transcript was ordered by Spencer. Holmes was deprived of 
an opportunity to order one because Spencer never complied with the transcript ordering 
procedure prescribed in Rule 11(e), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Holmes because of his obvious conflict of interest. [Judgment in Favor of John Holmes Construc-
tion and Against Thomas L. Spencer, ff6, 7, 8, and 9; R. 1359]. Spencer does not even address 
those grounds for the District Court's Judgment. 
The District Court was correct in ruling that Spencer's failure to preserve his alleged tender 
of a defense or Holmes' failure to demand a defense in his Answer to Holmes' Crossclaim 
precluded his offering evidence on these points. [Id. ff7 and 8]. When Holmes filed his Cross-
claim against Spencer, at the very outset of this action, Spencer denied any obligation to defend 
and did not allege that he was relieved of defending by any tender. Holmes then spent two years 
defending at considerable cost. After that defense was complete, Holmes sought recovery from 
Spencer under the Crossclaim. In defending against that Motion, Spencer, contrary to the Answer 
that he filed at the beginning of the case, took the position that he recognized a duty to defend 
Holmes and had in fact offered to defend Holmes. However, none of that was pleaded or 
suggested in Spencer's Answer to the Crossclaim (or indeed in any document anywhere in the 
record). To be preserved, affirmative defenses have to be raised. [Rule 8(c), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure]. Defenses not properly pleaded may not be raised by an affidavit in opposition to a 
Motion for Summary Judgment. Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. Wilken, 668 P.2d 493 (Utah 1983). A 
rejected tender of defense is obviously an affirmative defense.12 The purpose of the pleadings are 
to give the parties notice of a party's claims. Spencer's Answer to Holmes' Crossclaim can be 
reviewed with a magnifying glass, and it contains no hint of Spencer's position that he was willing 
12
 A matter is an affirmative defense when it is not put in issue by a denial of the 
allegations of a claim or otherwise embraced in the pleadings. E.g., Creekview Apartments v. 
State Farm Ins. Co., Ill P.2d 693 (Utah App. 1989); Pratt v. Board of Educ, 564 P.2d 294 
(Utah 1977). Here, the allegation of Holmes' Crossclaim and Spencer's denial of them did not 
give notice of or place at issue Spencer's claim that Holmes had not tendered its defense or that 
Spencer had offered a defense. 
to defend Holmes, had offered to defend Holmes, or anything of the kind. Instead, he denied any 
obligation to defend. His failure to raise that issue in pleadings properly prevents him from raising 
it as a defense to Holmes' Motion. He is also estopped by his pleading that he owed no duty of 
defense to now assert that he was willing to furnish a defense.,3 Even if Spencer is correct that 
Holmes' demand of a defense in paragraphs 5, 6, and 7 of its Crossclaim [R. 121-22], did not, 
contrary to the plain meaning of those words, constitute a demand for a defense, Spencer is still 
liable. No special form of tender of defense is prerequisite to recovery under a Warranty Deed's 
defense covenant. All that is required is that the grantor (Spencer) receive notice of the claim 
against which a defense is required. 
It has long been the law of this state that reasonable attorney's fees 
are recoverable as damages against the grantor of a warranty deed 
when those fees are incurred by the grantor in defending title and 
where the grantor has had notice of the pending action and has 
refused to defend. Espinoza v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 598 P.2d 346, 
348 (Utah 1979). 
To the same effect, see Van Cott v. Jacklin, 226 P. 460, 463 (Utah 1924) (if notice is given to the 
grantor that an action challenges title to the premises, the grantee may recover his defense costs). 
2. Necessity of Defense Costs. The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a 
grantee can recover from its grantor "reasonable attorney's fees" incurred in defending title . . . " 
Espinoza v. Safeco Title Ins. Co , 598 P.2d 346, 348 (Utah 1979); see Forrer v. Sathers, 595 P.2d 
1306, 1308 (Utah 1979) (measure of damages is "the recovery of a reasonable sum as attorney's 
fees"), Van Cott v. Jacklin, 226 P. 460, 463 (Utah 1924) (the grantee "may recover a reasonable 
sum as attorney's fees.") Spencer has not advanced any authority that the fees be "necessary." 
Obviously, that the fees be "reasonable" embraces some element that the work performed must 
13
 Arrowhead Constr. Co. v. Essex Corp., 662 P.2d 1195 (Kan. 1983); City ofEnglewood 
v. Rejfel, All P.2d 361 (Colo. 1970). 
reasonably have been necessary. Reasonableness is addressed in the section that follows. That a 
defense of Holmes in this case was "necessary" is obvious because plaintiffs sued Holmes seeking 
to deprive Holmes of title to the Property that Spencer warranted. If Spencer is arguing that 
Holmes' defense costs were unnecessary because Spencer's counsel was offered to defend Holmes, 
then that contention is addressed above in Section C.l. 
D. REASONABLENESS OF FEES AWARDED. 
In three different areas of his Brief, Spencer attacks the reasonableness of the legal fees that 
were awarded to Holmes. Each will be addressed in turn. 
1. Relationship to Amount at Issue. At pages 5 to 6 of his Brief, Spencer argues that 
Holmes' fees were unreasonable because they exceeded the amount of the loss to which Holmes 
was exposed. Spencer is wrong on several counts. Spencer stated in his Opposition to Holmes' 
Motion for Summary Judgment that the undisputed facts advanced by Holmes were "not. . . 
controverted." Those facts included the facts that Spencer sold and conveyed the subject real 
property to Holmes, that Holmes paid Spencer $236,111.00 therefor, and that plaintiffs' Com-
plaint, against which Holmes defended, alleges "that plaintiffs, and not Holmes, are the rightful 
owners of the subject property." After purchasing the Property, Holmes then constructed 
condominiums on the Property. Holmes in this action was defending its claim to property that, at 
the time of plaintiffs' challenge to it, was worth far in excess of a million dollars. 
Further, the evidentiary materials for which Spencer relies in making this argument 
[Spencer Brief, p. 6, n. 4] were not submitted to the Court until after Holmes' Motion for Summary 
Judgment had been argued and the Court had granted the Motion. Spencer filed these materials as 
a part of his Motion to Reconsider Amount of Attorney's Fees Awarded. [R. 1330, 1332, 1343]. 
The Court denied Spencer's Motion to Reconsider and Spencer does not appeal from that Order. 
Evidence not submitted to the Court prior to its ruling on a summary judgment or properly rejected 
by the Court may not be'considered on appeal. Hartford Leasing Corp. v. State, 888 P.2d 694, 698 
n.3 (Utah App. 1994), cert, denied 899 P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995); Territorial Savings & LoanAss'n v. 
Baird, 781 P.2d 452 (Utah App. 1989). The Court refused the admission of the same materials at 
the hearing of Holmes' Motion for Summary Judgment because they were not timely submitted and 
lacked evidentiary foundation. [Judgment in Favor of John Holmes Construction and Against 
Thomas L. Spencer, fE (R. 1359)]. 
Finally, Spencer's claim is in any event incorrect. Spencer claims that Byington and 
Webster seek only 14.81% of the net proceeds of the sale — $21,000.00. However, as Spencer 
admitted in his Opposition to Holmes1 Motion for Summary Judgment plaintiffs in this action 
claimed ownership of the entire property — not a tiny fraction of Holmes' purchase price. [R. 714; 
765]. If plaintiffs were only claiming a part of the price, they would have sued only Spencer (who 
received it all) and would not have filed a lis pendens against the Property [R. 686] and sued 
Holmes, with whom plaintiffs never dealt. They also would not have included a "Quiet Title" 
count in their Complaint seeking an adjudication that they owned the Property or a slander of title 
count claiming that defendants' (including Holmes) claims to the Property slandered plaintiffs' title. 
[R. 010]. Holmes successful summary judgment against plaintiffs concerned only whether 
plaintiffs owned the property - plaintiffs made no monetary claims against Holmes. [R. 681]. 
Spencer also ignores the fact that Summit Condo 4, a partnership of which plaintiffs are part, is a 
named plaintiff that owned the entire property according to plaintiffs' Complaint. That entire 
interest was asserted in this action. In short, Spencer is not accurately describing plaintiffs' claims 
against Holmes in this case. 
Spencer's arguments (i) ignore the undisputed facts which Spencer conceded for purposes 
of Holmes' motion, (ii) are based on evidence not properly before the district court, and (iii) are 
contrary to plaintiffs' pleaded claims. 
2. There was no Issue of Fact Concerning the Reasonableness of the Fees 
Awarded. Holmes' counsel filed an Affidavit enumerating the services that were performed 
setting forth the time expended in performing those services, and setting forth all of the require-
ments of both the Utah Supreme Court as stated in Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985 
(Utah 1988) and Rule 4-505, C J. A. and attested to the reasonableness of the amounts requested. 
Concededly, Spencer's counsel filed an Affidavit stating that, in his opinion, the fees were 
unreasonable. [R. 779]. The Affidavit of Spencer's counsel does not create any issue of fact as to 
the reasonableness of Holmes' fees for the reasons that follow. 
First, the Willardson Affidavit's unsupported conclusion that Holmes' fees were unreason-
able will not prevent summary judgment. An affidavit containing an expert's unsupported 
conclusion will be ignored and does not create an issue of fact for purposes of summary judgment. 
The Utah Supreme Court addressed this issue in Butterfieldv. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97 (Utah 1992). 
The Court there held that an expert's conclusions, without specific factual foundation, will not 
prevent summary judgment: 
We therefore follow the path laid in Williams to the explicit holding 
that affidavits must include not only the expert's opinion, but also the 
specific facts that logically support the expert's conclusion. In so 
doing, we stress the requirement that rule 56(e) requires specific 
facts.. . . A bare assertion that the expert has reviewed the facts and 
based his or her opinion on them will not suffice. Id. at 104 (em-
phasis original). 
A fair summary of the Willardson Affidavit on this point is that (i) Spencer would have handled 
Holmes' defense if Holmes had agreed and therefore Holmes' fees were unnecessary, (ii) Willard-
son helped Holmes whenever possible, (iii) Willardson spent 130.5 hours doing his work as of 
July, 1999, and (iv) Holmes1 attorney spent almost twice the time that Willardson did, while 
defending fewer issues. [R. 780). 
Item (i) is inaccurate and irrelevant, as explained in Section C.l. of this Brief. Item (ii) is 
irrelevant and inadmissible because Mr. Willardson does not share with us what he did on behalf of 
Holmes or how his efforts benefitted Holmes. In addition, however, a review of the record will 
demonstrate that Spencer did only two things that arguably could have benefitted Holmes, neither 
of which was of any help. Spencer filed a Motion to Dismiss at the outset of the case, which the 
Court denied. He also filed a document in connection with Holmes' Motion for Summary 
Judgment Against Plaintiffs in which Spencer stated that he did not oppose Holmes' Motion. The 
record (including the Willardson Affidavit) is devoid of anything Spencer's counsel did for 
Holmes. Further, whether Willardson incidentally helped Holmes somehow is irrelevant to 
whether Holmes' legal fees were reasonable. 
As to items (iii) and (iv), Mr. Willardson states that he spent only 130.5 hours in defending 
Spencer and that his duties entailed a wider scope of issues than did the duties of Holmes' counsel. 
The amount of time that Mr. Willardson chose to spend on behalf of his client (who lost at each 
stage of the proceedings) is not relevant to the amount of time that would be reasonable to spend 
on behalf of Holmes. To properly challenge time spent by Holmes' counsel, Mr. Willardson was 
required to opine, with some basis, that the amount of time expended in performing the duties that 
Holmes' counsel performed was unreasonable. Mr. Willardson did not do this. Further, Willard-
son's claim that he defended a wider scale of issues than did Holmes' counsel is simply wrong. 
Holmes' counsel was required not only to defend against all of the claims against Spencer which 
plaintiffs alleged were chargeable to Holmes, but also was required to pursue its own, ultimately 
successful, defense that Holmes, as a bona fide purchaser of the property, was not chargeable with 
Spencer's misdeeds. Spencer's defense did not entail defending the title to the Property at all. 
Finally, although the amount of time spent by Willardson on behalf of Spencer is not relevant to 
whether the time expended on behalf of Holmes was reasonable, the amounts of time expended on 
behalf of both parties are not as different as Mr. Willardson suggests.14 Because the Willardson 
Affidavit does not contain any relevant factual foundation for his bald conclusion that Holmes' fees 
were unreasonable, it does not create an issue of fact on that point under the Butterfield case. 
In Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988), the Utah Supreme Court stated 
that in determining the reasonableness of a legal fee, the Court must consider what work was 
performed, how much work was reasonably necessary, whether the billing rate is consistent with 
local rates, and other considerations including those set forth in the Code of Professional Responsi-
bility. "What an attorney bills or the number of hours spent on a case is not determinative." Id at 
990. If a trial court must address those factors in arriving at the reasonableness of a fee, themso 
also must an expert opining on reasonableness. Mr. Willardson's Affidavit is devoid of any 
consideration of those factors. Holmes' counsel's Affidavit in support of the award, however, 
addressed all of those factors. [R. 706-11]. This is an independent ground why the Willardson 
Affidavit cannot, as a matter of law, create an issue as to the reasonableness of Holmes' legal fees. 
3. Duplicative Work. At page 13 of Spencer's Brief, he asserts that the work of 
Holmes' counsel was "largely duplicative of work performed by Spencer's attorney." This 
14
 Other than filing a two page notice that Spencer, et al. "do not oppose" Holmes' 
Motion for Summary Judgment, Mr. Willardson did not participate in Holmes' Motion for 
Summary Judgment, which involved voluminous filings and extensive proceedings. Over 76 
hours were expended in prosecuting Holmes' successful Motion for Summary Judgment. [R. 
706; 862-63]. Adding those hours to the 130 lA hours that Spencer's lawyer spent on the case 
(and presumably believes is reasonable as of the time of Holmes' Motion) [R. 780] yields a total 
of over 206 hours - about 90% of the total hours claimed by Holmes' counsel. 
argument was not raised before the trial court and can therefore not be considered now here.15 
There is also no evidentiary foundation for this statement. Mr. Willardson's Affidavit filed in 
opposition to the Motion contains no such statement. Not surprisingly, Spencer does not share 
with us any examples of such duplicative work. Holmes filed all its own pleadings. Holmes 
conducted its own discovery of the plaintiffs' claims against Holmes. Holmes, not Spencer, 
initiated, took, and paid for plaintiffs' depositions. Almost 40 percent of time spent by Holmes' 
counsel was expended in pursuing Holmes' Motion for Summary Judgment against plaintiffs. 
Spencer's total involvement in that Motion was to file a two-page document stating that Spencer 
"does not oppose" Holmes' Motion. Spencer did not develop or brief the issues that were 
dispositive of Holmes' involvement in this case. The lack of duplication is predictable. Holmes 
and Spencer occupied two very different positions in this case. Spencer focused upon an effort to 
disprove that he had taken plaintiffs' property without paying for it, an effort that failed. Holmes' 
efforts in this case were to validate Spencer's deeds and to distance itself from Spencer's miscon-
duct and demonstrate that Holmes acquired the Property for a valuable consideration without 
notice of Spencer's misdeeds. Spencer's claim that Holmes' counsel largely duplicated Spencer's 
attorney's work is completely unsupported and palpably inaccurate. 
4. Holmes' Counsel did not Run Up His Bill. Spencer asserts that it is "unreason-
able to run up legal bills for a year before moving to dismiss such claims" and that "[there was 
nothing that was done by Holmes' counsel after expending the large amount of fees that could not 
have been done immediately upon receipt of the complaint." Spencer Brief at page 13. Holmes 
invites the Court to review its Motion for Summary Judgment Against Plaintiffs and the eviden-
tiary basis for that Motion, none of which existed before discovery was conducted. Holmes was 
15
 See footnote 7 above. 
faced with losing property worth seven figures based on plaintiffs' claims that Spencer's deeds 
were invalid and that Holmes acquired the Property with actual or constructive notice of Spencer's 
now adjudicated misconduct. Mr. Willardson apparently suggests that the correct tactic would 
have been immediately to move to dismiss under those circumstances, without conducting any 
discovery to determine the basis for plaintiffs' claims or allowing plaintiffs to conduct discovery 
themselves so as to avoid the inevitable motion under Rule 56(f) seeking an opportunity to do so. 
Given the amounts at issue and the nature of plaintiffs' claims against Holmes, to have pursued that 
course would have been to malpractice. 
In summary, because the Willardson Affidavit does not properly explain the factual basis 
for the unsupported unreasonableness conclusion contained therein and because it does not comply 
with the requirements of Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, Willardson's unreasonableness opinion does 
not create an issue of fact precluding summary judgment. Further, each of the bases advanced by 
Spencer either in the Willardson Affidavit or in his Brief why Holmes' fees were unreasonable are 
either raised for the first time on appeal, lack evidentiary foundation, or are, as a matter of law, 
incorrect or irrelevant. The trial court found that the attorney's fees incurred on behalf of Holmes 
for its successful defense were reasonable, and Spencer has not advanced any reason why that 
finding should be overturned. 
CONCLUSION 
Holmes respectfully requests that this Court affirm the Judgment of the trial court below 
and award Holmes its costs on appeal. 
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